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Abstract 
Social reproduction is the highest for self-employed as shown by an extensive literature from 
developed and developing countries. Very few studies however document the reason for this high 
intergenerational correlation of the self-employed status. The rare studies that have been done concern 
the US and show that children of self-employed benefit from an advantage when they are themselves 
self-employed. The purpose of this paper is to test if the second-generation of self-employed has an 
advantage related to the first-generation in the African context. It aims at highlighting the debate on 
firms heterogeneity in the informal sector, and seeks to contribute to understand the intergenerational 
transmission of inequalities. Using 1-2-3 surveys collected in the commercial capitals of seven West 
African countries in 2001-2002, this paper shows that the second-generation of informal self-
employed does not have better outcomes than the first one, except when they choose a familial 
tradition in the same sector of activity. Thus, in the African context, having a self-employed father 
does not provide any advantage in terms of profit or sales and is not sufficient for the transmission of 
valuable skills. On the other hand, informal entrepreneurs who have chosen a specific enterprise based 
on familial tradition have a competitive advantage. Their competitive advantage is partly explained by 
the transmission of enterprise-specific human capital, acquired through experiences in the same type 
of activity and by the transmission of social capital. 
Keywords: Informal sector, entrepreneurship, intergenerational link, human capital. 
Résumé 
Très peu d’études documentent les raisons de la très forte reproduction sociale observée parmi les 
entrepreneurs, aussi bien dans les pays développés que dans les pays en développement. Les rares 
études, portant sur les E.U, montrent que les enfants d’entrepreneurs ont de meilleures performances 
quand ils sont eux-mêmes entrepreneurs que les enfants de salariés. Cet article teste si ce résultat se 
vérifie dans le contexte du secteur informel ouest-africain et cherche à en comprendre les raisons. Il 
vise par conséquent à éclairer le débat portant sur l’hétérogénéité des entreprises informelles, en 
identifiant des facteurs de succès, mais il cherche aussi à mieux comprendre les mécanismes à 
l’origine de la transmission intergénérationnelles des inégalités en Afrique. En se basant sur les 
enquêtes 1-2-3 collectées dans sept capitale ouest-africaines, cet article montre que la seconde 
génération d’entrepreneurs informels ne bénéficient pas d’un avantage comparatif, sauf s’ils 
bénéficient d’une tradition familiale dans leur secteur d’activité. Ainsi, dans le contexte ouest-africain, 
avoir un père entrepreneur ne suffit pas à la transmission de compétences managériales. En revanche, 
les entrepreneurs qui ont choisi leur secteur d’activité par tradition familiale ont un avantage qui 
s’explique principalement par la transmission de compétences spécifiques au secteur d’activité et par 
la transmission d’un capital social. 
Mots clés : Secteur informel, entreprenariat, lien intergénérationnel, capital humain 
JEL Classification: L26, J24, J62. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the 1970’s, research on informal sector constitutes a growing part of the literature. The 
upsurge in interest is at least partly because most households in many developing countries, in 
particular poor households, derive a large part of their earnings from the informal sector. It 
constitutes an often unacknowledged contribution to national production levels as well. 
However, despite nearly four decades of research, no consensus has emerged on the origin 
and the persistence of the informal sector. A long tradition, namely the “dualist school”, views 
informal sector as the less-advantaged segment of a dual-labour market (Lewis 1954, Harris 
and Todaro 1970, Pradhan 1995). In this view, informal entrepreneurship is the result of the 
saturation of the formal sector. Therefore, being worker in the informal sector is a constrained 
choice and a large informal sector is evidence of inefficiency. A more recent approach views 
the informal sector as a set of dynamic small firms, where individuals choose to be informal 
entrepreneurs because they expect a higher welfare than if they were wage-earners or formal 
entrepreneurs (Maloney 2004, Packard 2007). In this approach, a large share of informal self-
employed may reflect an efficient allocation of labour. While the debate has become in the 
last years increasingly polarized (Bacchetta et al. 2009), an integrated approach is currently 
arising based on the idea of multi-segmented labour-markets (Chen 2005, Fields 2005). This 
alternative approach considers that the informal sector comprises different segments. The 
upper-tier segment may be populated by entrepreneurs who choose to enter into the informal 
sector while the lower-tier segment may be dominated by constrained households that may 
not have other choice of activity.   
While there is no consensus on the voluntary nature of entry into informal self-employment, 
strong evidence points to a strong intergenerational transmission of the self-employed status. 
In the USA, half of the self-employed workers have a self-employed in their family (Dunn 
and Holt-Eakin 2000). In France, 41% of entrepreneurs have a father or father-in-law who is 
entrepreneur (Laferrère and McEntee 2001). This high intergenerational correlation of the 
self-employed status has been shown to be related to an advantage in terms of expected 
earnings of those entrepreneurs with self-employed fathers (Dunn and Holt-Eakin 2000, Lentz 
and Laband 1990, Fairlie and Robb 2007a 2007b, Colombier and Masclet 2006, 2008, 
Laferrère and McEntee 1996).  
For developing countries, there is almost no evidence on the intergenerational transmission of 
the employment status. An exception is Pasquier-Doumer (2010a) who shows high social 
reproduction rates for the self-employed in West Africa. Starting from this observation, the 
present paper addresses the following questions: First, do the children of self-employed 
become themselves informal self-employed because they have an advantage relatively to the 
children of wage earner? Second, which are the sources of this advantage? Do they have a 
better access to valuable human capital, physical or social capital? If they had such advantage, 
one could support the idea that second-generation of self-employed would choose voluntary 
to enter into informal sector because they expect better incomes.  
Addressing these questions is particularly relevant in the African context. Inequalities in 
Africa are very high and social mobility very low (Cogneau et al. 2007). The intergenerational 
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transmission of occupation is one possible cause of low social mobility. Furthermore, 
informal activities are the main provider of incomes and of jobs for most African urban 
dwellers (Brilleau et al. 2005). In addition, informal sector is the prevalent place of 
professionalization and integration of young people into the labour market, in particular for 
those who drop out of school (Walther 2007). Then, the paper will shed light on the 
heterogeneity of the informal sector, by testing whether entrepreneurial familial background 
may be a source of success for informal businesses.   
To address these issues, I use a set of surveys called 1-2-3 surveys and carried out between 
2001 and 2002 in seven economic capitals of West African Economic and Monetary Union. 
An important finding of this research is that having a self-employed father does not provide 
any advantage in terms of profit or sales and is not sufficient for the transmission of valuable 
skills, in the African context. However, informal entrepreneurs who have chosen a specific 
enterprise based on familial tradition have a competitive advantage. Their competitive 
advantage is partly explained by the transmission of enterprise-specific human capital, 
acquired through experiences in the same type of activity and by the transmission of social 
capital. 
Section 2 presents the conceptual framework and the hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 
provides an overview of the data and the main characteristics of the second generation of self-
employed. Section 4 describes the estimation strategy. Section 5 examines the existence of a 
competitive advantage for the second-generation of informal self-employed. Section 6 
analyses the composition of this advantage. Section 7 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. Conceptual background and hypotheses 
Some studies analyze the impact of having self-employed parents for developed countries on 
the determinants of becoming self-employed rather than wage earner (Dunn and Holtz-Eakin 
2000, Colombier and Masclet 2008, Laferrère and McEntee 1996). They all conclude that 
there is a substantially higher probability to become self-employed among children of self-
employed. Two main channels are identified. First, successful entrepreneurs may be more 
able and willing to transfer financial wealth to their children and thus allow them to relax 
capital market constraints. Second, parents transmit to their children valuable work 
experience, reputation or other managerial human capital. Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (2000) find 
that, in the USA, family loans contribute very little to the correlation of self-employment 
status across generations. In contrast, self-employment experience of the parents has a strong 
effect. Because parental experience has a greater impact when parents were successful, the 
authors conclude that the significance of parents’ self-employment reflects the transmission of 
skills or other aspects of human capital and not the conveyance of tastes for autonomy or for a 
self-employed lifestyle.  
To my knowledge, only two studies aim at understanding the impact of familial background 
on small business outcomes (Lentz and Laband 1990, Fairlie and Robb 2007b). Again both 
relate to the USA. Lentz and Laband (1990) suggest that individuals acquire general 
managerial skills while growing up in the context of family business through the continued 
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exposure to the family business. Children of self-employed have then an advantage compared 
with children of wage-earners, who do not see their parents at work: “The father/teacher 
passes on to his son valuable human capital about running a business operation; the son 
acquires this integrated, managerial human capital as a by-product of growing up. By the 
time he reaches the age of, say, eighteen, when most other youths his age are just starting to 
acquire job-specific skills (via employment training programs) or more general occupational 
skills (via college), the son of proprietor normally has already had an opportunity to 
accumulate the equivalent of an integrated, managerial education.” (p. 564). The authors 
show that second-generation of self-employed have greater success compared with first-
generation self-employed. Because second-generation of self-employed are found to start their 
businesses at a significantly younger age and to commence their business careers with a 
significantly greater quantity of managerial human capital, the authors conclude that children 
of self-employed have a competitive advantage through early acquisition of managerial 
human capital, and that this advantage will predictably serve to motivate voluntary choice of 
being self-employed in children of self-employed.  
Along similar lines, Fairlie and Robb (2007b) identify three potential channels that can 
explain the better outcomes of the second generation of self-employed: the acquisition of 
general business or managerial experience in family-owned businesses, the acquisition of 
industry- or firm-specific business experience in family-owned businesses and inheritances of 
businesses. In the latter case, parents transmit capital as a reputation capital or an established 
clientele from one generation to the next. With another dataset than Lentz and Laband, they 
show that having a prior work experience in a family member’s business is a significant 
determinant of small business outcomes. They also find that inherited businesses are more 
successful than non-inherited, but their representation among the population of small 
businesses is very limited. The authors conclude that the second-generation of self-employed 
has an advantage in terms of business outcomes compared with self-employed without self-
employed family member through the transmission of managerial experience and/or firm-
specific business experience.  
In developing countries, there is no study that specifically addresses the impact of familial 
background on informal business outcomes. However, some evidence can be found in the 
related literature on social capital, in particular on the effects of familial kin-ship on 
businesses outcomes. For example, Fafchamps (2002) investigates whether social networks 
improve firm productivity among agricultural traders in Madagascar. While a quarter of 
surveyed traders had either a father or a mother in trade and 14% are in this business because 
of family traditions, the author finds that having close relatives in agricultural trade does not 
have a positive effect on productivity.  Furthermore, productivity is higher among traders who 
learned the business on their own and did not receive coaching from relatives. The author 
therefore concludes that family relationships do not constitute a productive component of 
social capital. Following Granovetter (1995), the author interprets his result as evidence that 
strong links are less useful than weak links, perhaps because they carry less information. 
However, Fafchamps’ results may not be generalized to the whole informal sector and to 
West African countries. Firstly, the way of acquisition of skills in West African countries is 
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very different from that in Madagascar and, secondly, trade is a specific sector of activity in 
terms of acquisition of skills and level of capital required.  
In the West African informal sector, there are two main ways to acquire skills: through 
traditional apprenticeship training and through informal on-the-job learning (Haan 2006, 
Liimatainen 2002). Traditional apprenticeship in the informal sector consists of private 
contractual arrangements between an apprentice or his/her parents and a master craftsman 
who agrees to provide practical training in the workplace, and subsequently certify the 
training in return for a fee or reduced earnings while learning1. In the capital of seven West 
African countries, 28% of the informal business owners have learned their profession through 
traditional apprenticeship training, whereas this proportion is only 14% in the Malagasy 
capital. If trade is excluded, then the share of traditional apprenticeship training rises to 41% 
of informal business owners in West African countries but only 17% in Madagascar2. 
Therefore, informal apprenticeship is much less frequent in Madagascar than in West Africa, 
and less in trade activities than in manufacturing or non-trade service activities. Finally, trade 
is a very specific sector of activities in terms of the amount of capital required. For example, 
in the West African countries the average amount of capital in informal trade businesses is 
528 international dollars compared with 1053 in the other sectors3.   
Hypotheses 
The brief literature review illustrates that evidence on the effects of familial background on 
informal businesses outcomes is indeed scarce in the context of developing countries. The 
main hypothesis to be tested is whether second generation informal entrepreneurs has a 
competitive advantage compared with the first generation. I then attempt to identify the 
channels that can explain possible differences in business outcomes. Following the empirical 
literature on developed countries, two main channels are tested: physical capital transfers and 
human capital transfers. As in developed countries, having a self-employed family member 
may facilitate the acquisition of physical capital for two possible reasons: Self-employed, at 
least successful ones, may have more capacity to invest than a wage earner. Alternatively, 
some of the second generation self-employed simply inherit a part or the whole enterprise 
from their family member.   
As Lentz and Laband (1990), I distinguish two types of human capital transfers, general-
managerial and enterprise-specific skills. General administrative and personnel management 
skills fall into the former type, while information specific to the firm’s production process 
characterizes the latter. I assume that growing up in a self-employed family may procure 
                                                            
1 In West Africa, informal apprenticeship training is commonly conceived in three phases: during the first year, 
the apprentice  is expected to observe what the master craftsman and the workshop workers are doing.  In a 
second phase, the apprentice is shown certain practices and gradually asked to do some practical work. In the 
ultimate phase, the apprentice is fully involved in workshop activities and held responsible for his or her output 
(Haan  2006).  During  this  last  phase,  organizational,  management  and  business  skills  are  also  transmitted, 
including costing, marketing, as supplier and customer relations. 
2 Source: Author's computation based on 1‐2‐3 surveys (Phases 2, 2001/02, AFRISTAT, DIAL, INS for Abidjan, 
Bamako, Cotonou, Dakar, Lome, Niamey, Ouagadougou and Phase 2, 2001/02, INSTAT, DIAL for Antananarivo). 
3 Source: Author's computation based on 1‐2‐3 surveys (Phases 2, 2001/02, AFRISTAT, DIAL, INS) 
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better endowments in general-managerial skills, as a by-product of the continued exposure to 
the family business. In addition, there is intergenerational transmission of enterprise-specific 
skills only if the sector of activity of the family business is closely related to the one of the 
respondent. For this reason, I consider two types of second-generation of self-employed. First, 
those whose parents were self-employed in a business which was essentially unrelated to the 
one of the respondent (SE hereafter), and second those whose parents or family members were 
owners of a highly similar business (TRAD hereafter).  
Indeed, having a family member involved in the same type of activity can improve the 
acquisition of enterprise-specific skills, in particular in the West African context where 
traditional apprenticeship is prevalent. The choice of the master is essential for the 
transmission of skills. Some masters may take advantage of a high demand for training, 
multiplying the number of apprentices. Consequently, they do not have time to supervise the 
apprentices and they do not have enough turnovers to make them practice (Charmes and 
Oudin 1994). If one of the members of the family is involved in a certain type of business, it 
may be easier for the family to choose a master with high professional skills and sufficient 
turnover. Moreover, family ties continue to play an important role in the selection of 
apprentices in West Africa (Birks et al. 1994). Having family members in the same activity 
may allow young people to be more easily accepted by a “good” master. In addition, because 
traditional apprenticeship training has its roots in socio-cultural traditions that restricted the 
transfer of skills to members of the family or the clan (Haan 2006), one can think that the 
transmission of enterprise- specific skills may be better with a master related to the family. 
In the case of acquisition of human capital through experience, having a self-employed family 
member may increase the opportunities to accumulate experience in his/her business. This 
experience may also be more valuable in terms of acquisition of skills because the owner may 
give more responsibility to a family member. Indeed, socio-cultural traditions facilitate 
transmission of skills inside the family, and the family could have a greater interest in the 
professional success of one of its members than in that of someone unrelated to the family.  
For all these reasons, having a self-employed family member in the same type of activities 
may increase endowments in enterprise-specific skills but also return to these skills.  
In their study, Lentz and Laband (1990) do not include social capital as a possible way of 
intergenerational transmission of self-employed status. Fairlie and Robb (2007b) introduce it 
but very indirectly, as a component of the inheritance of a family enterprise. They do not 
formally test it. Because of imperfect markets, social capital plays in developing countries a 
crucial role in the performance of informal businesses (Bacchetta et al. 2009). As shown by 
Fafchamps (2002), social capital and more precisely social networks improve the circulation 
of reliable information about technology and market opportunities as well as the blacklisting 
of unreliable agents. Social capital can also make it easier to build up a clientele through 
reputation and trust. In addition, as shown by Pasquier-Doumer (2010b) a large part of the 
social network mobilized with the aim of improving professional activities is related to the 
family. One can thus think that the potential advantage of entrepreneurs with family members 
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involved in this type of business can be partly explained by better endowments in social 
capital but also by higher return to this capital.  
To sum up, I suppose that the channels that can explain possible competitive advantage of 
second-generation of self-employed are the intergenerational transmission of general-
managerial skills and physical capital or higher return to these factors, as far as children of 
self-employed are concerned (SE). For entrepreneurs with self-employed family member in 
the same type of activities (TRAD), one may add two other channels: transmission of 
enterprise-specific skills and social capital.  
 
3. Data and characteristics of second-generation of self-employed 
The Data 
In this study, I use a set of surveys called 1-2-3 surveys and carried out between 2001 and 
2002 in seven economic capitals of West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) 
countries: Cotonou (Benin), Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso), Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire), Bamako 
(Mali), Niamey (Niger), Dakar (Senegal) and Lomé (Togo). A 1-2-3 survey is a multi-layer 
survey organized in three phases and specially designed to study the informal sector (see 
Brilleau, Ouedraogo and Roubaud, 2005). For this paper, I use the phases 1 and 2 of the 
surveys. Phase 1 is a representative labour force survey collecting detailed information about 
individual employment and socio-demographic characteristics, in particular the sector and 
status of activity of the father when the individual was 15 years old. Phase 2 is a survey which 
interviews a sub-sample of informal production units identified in Phase 1. It provides very 
detailed data on profit, sales, investment, and inputs of the informal enterprises and on the 
characteristics of the owner. The 1-2-3 surveys define informal enterprises as small 
production units that (a) do not have written formal accounts and/or (b) are not registered with 
the tax administration. The 1-2-3 surveys do not apply a size criterion. 
A major advantage of the 1-2-3 survey is its nested structure because Phase 1 ensures that 
Phase 2 delivers a representative picture of the informal sector. Another one is that it allows 
us to identify the second generation of self-employed. Second generation of self-employed is 
defined in two ways. In a broad definition, it includes the informal business owners, whose 
father was self-employed (SE)4. In a narrow definition, informal entrepreneurs of the second 
generation of self-employed are defined as entrepreneurs whose benefit from a familial 
tradition in the way to run a business in their sector of activity (TRAD)5. It is important to note 
that SE and TRAD are not exclusive: an informal entrepreneur may have a father self-
employed in a different sector of activity and another family member in the same sector of 
                                                            
4 The activity of the mother was not included in the Phase 1 questionnaire. This is the reason why I had to limit 
the analysis to the activity of the father.  
5 More precisely, TRAD takes the value 1 if the owner says  
- She or he has created the informal business by familial tradition, and/or 
- She or he has chosen the informal business’ product/services by familial tradition, and/or 
- One of his/her family members has created the informal business. 
9 
activity. Overlap may also exist when the father is self-employed in the same sector of 
activity. 
1-2-3 survey also provides a number of useful proxies of skills, social capital and the 
intergenerational transmission of physical capital. To take into account general managerial 
skills, I have three variables at my disposal. The first one is whether the entrepreneur has had 
a managerial experience before becoming the owner of the informal business surveyed. A 
previous experience as entrepreneur in another business is supposed to increase the ability of 
the owner to manage the informal business. The second proxy is whether the owner knows 
micro-finance institutions. It reveals better access to information that could improve 
productivity, and better access to external finance as well. The last one is whether the owner 
keeps books. It implicates better organization in the way of conducting the business.  
There are three proxies of enterprise-specific skills. The first one takes the value 1 if the 
owner learned his profession by traditional apprenticeship training and the value 0 otherwise, 
for the most part if he or she learned his profession on his own. Traditional apprenticeship 
training gives to the owner a previous experience in his sector of activity during which 
transmission of enterprise-specific skills may be high. The second proxy is whether the 
entrepreneur has worked in the informal business before becoming the owner. This experience 
may give him a good knowledge of technology used in the business, of market opportunities, 
of clientele and suppliers. It also allows him to be known by the clientele. The third one is the 
number of years of experience in his actual activity. 
Social capital of the informal entrepreneur is approached by two dummies. The first one takes 
the value 1 if the entrepreneur says he or she doesn’t have any difficulties in finding clientele 
and that the lack of clients is not the main obstacle to activity development. It takes the value 
0 if one of these statements is not made. This variable may reflect consumer loyalty, good 
reputation, and that the business is well-known. However, this variable may generate an 
endogeneity bias because it is likely that the self-assessment of the owner is influenced by the 
profit level. Entrepreneurs with high profit are more likely to say they don’t have any lack of 
clientele. That is why I retain the membership to a professional association as proxy of social 
capital. This variable is supposed to be more exogeneous. In the West-African context, 
knowing the way of joining a professional association and being accepted as member may be 
more linked with the level of social capital than with the size of the enterprise, although this 
topic is very poorly documented.  Another way of convincing the reader is that the size of the 
enterprise measured by the log of the amount of capital or by the log of the profit is a very 
poor predictor of the membership to a professional association6.  
                                                            
6 When  I estimate a  logit model, where membership to a professional association  is the dependant variable, 
the  log of  the  amount of  capital  and  the  age of  the  enterprise  are  the  regressors,  and where  sex,  level of 
schooling, migration status, religion, ethnic group, polygamous status of the owner are introduced as controls, I 
am able to predict correctly the membership to a professional association in only 0.3% of cases.  
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Inherited physical capital is taken into account using two variables: (i) the amount of physical 
capital obtained from the family7, and (ii) a dummy that takes the value 1 if the physical 
capital obtained from the family is higher than half of the whole amount of physical capital.  
For all countries, I have at my disposal 5718 informal enterprises surveyed with 
corresponding data of the phase 1, and thus, on average, 817 enterprises per economic 
capital8. Unfortunately, the scarcity of entrepreneurs with family members involved in the 
same type of activity (on average 120 per capital) does not allow me to conduct a separate 
analysis for each city. All the data are pooled and I use country dummies in the estimations.   
What distinguish second generation of self-employed? 
The second-generation of self-employed represents 66% of the informal business owners. 
Among them, 61% have a self-employed father and 16% benefit from familial tradition9 
(Table 1). As expected, second-generation of self-employed has on average better outcomes 
than the other informal business owners10. However, the difference is only significant for the 
informal businesses with familial tradition. Their enterprises are older, in particular when they 
benefit from a familial tradition and they are more homogeneous with regard to ethnic criteria 
and familial relationship. Informal businesses with familial tradition are in addition more 
labour intensive and less capital intensive. They are overrepresented in the sector of wholesale 
or retail shops and services, with the exception of repair services and transport, where they are 
underrepresented, as in the sector of construction (Table 1). On the contrary, entrepreneurs 
with a self-employed father are overrepresented in the sector of petty traders and 
underrepresented in the sector of services.  
Besides differences in the characteristics of their businesses, second generation of self-
employed distinguish themselves by several personal characteristics (Table 2).  
First, they are less educated and more experienced. They have on average two less years of 
schooling and two more years of experience in their profession. This result is similar to the 
one obtained by Lentz and Laband (1990) for USA and by Colombier and Masclet (2006) for 
Europe. These authors explain this result by a relatively less need for second-generation of 
self-employed to acquire formal training since they have the opportunity to accumulate 
equivalent training through the occupation of their father.  
                                                            
7 More precisely, I consider that physical capital is obtained from the family if the owner said that the capital is 
funded by familial loan, inheritance or by donation from one member of the family or from a friend. 
Unfortunately in the latter case, we cannot distinguish in the survey between friends and family. I suppose that 
donation from friends is virtually nonexistent, as shown by Pasquier‐Doumer (2010b) in the case of 
Ouagadougou.  
8 Minimum: 632 in Niamey; Maximum: 942 in Dakar.  
9 16% of second‐generation of self‐employed have both a self‐employed father and have benefited from a 
familial tradition.  
10 Except for sales as far as the whole second generation of self‐employed or owner with self‐employed father 
are concerned; 
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Then, the second generation of self-employed has a disadvantaged background, as shown by 
the weaker level of schooling of their father. They are more often migrants, whatever the 
definition of self-employed used.   
Table 1: Characteristics of informal businesses  
Informal business characteristics 
(1) 2nd 
genera-
tion  
(2) 
First 
genera-
tion  
(2)-(1) (3) With  
self-
employed 
father 
(SE) 
(4) 
Non 
SE 
(4)-
(3) 
(5) With 
familial 
tradition 
(TRAD) 
(6) 
Non 
Trad 
(6)-
(5)
Profit (mean, Int. $) 348.0 323.1 NS 328.5 309.2 NS 379.6 309.6 **
Sales (mean, Int. $) 1133.6 1027.9 NS 990.8 959.9 NS 1170.3 941.7 ***
Capital (mean, Int. $) 790.0 757.4 NS 790.2 761.6 NS 713.2 791.6 NS
Paid labour (mean, monthly hours) 247.6 243.4 NS 246.0 246.5 NS 271.7 241.3 ***
Age of the enterprise (mean) 7.5 5.9 *** 7.2 6,5 *** 9.9 6,4 ***
Ethnic homogeneity in the enterprise (%) 95.7 94.4 *** 95.7 94.6 *** 96.1 95.1 ***
Share of the workers from the same family 
(%) 
92.0 90.4 *** 91.9 90,9 ** 93,6 91.1 ***
Sectors of activity (%)                 
Clothing and apparel  9.7 11.0 * 9.7 10.7 NS 7.4 10.6 NS
Other manufacturing and food 11.5 13.4 NS 11.4 13.3 NS 11.6 12.2 NS
Construction 5.7 5.7 NS 5.8 5.6 NS 2.9 6.2 ***
Wholesale/retail shops 12.0 9.6 NS 12.0 9.9 NS 15.9 10.2 ***
Petty traders 35.0 33.4 *** 35.0 33.7 *** 33.8 34.6 NS
Hotels and restaurants 6.3 6.1 NS 6.3 6.2 NS 5.8 6.3 NS
Repair services 4.4 4.9 *** 4.4 4.8 ** 3.3 4.8 ***
Transport 3.8 3.6 NS 3.8 3.6 NS 1.9 4.1 ***
Other services 11.7 12.3 NS 11.7 12.3 NS 17.2 10.8 ***
N obs 3571 2147   3253 2465   843 4875   
Frequency 66.2 33.8   60.7 39.3   16.2 83.8   
Source: Author's computation based on 1-2-3 surveys (Phases 1 and 2, 2001/02, AFRISTAT, DIAL, INS) 
Note: The column Sign test with t-test the significance of the difference between SE versus non-SE and between 
TRAD and non-TRAD. *, **, ***, NS means respectively that the difference is significant at the 10% level, 5% 
level, 1% level, not significant.  
 
If the results of Lentz and Laband (1990) stand in the West African context, I expect that 
children of self-employed have more managerial skills and a higher familial investment in 
terms of physical capital. In this first descriptive approach, it seems not to be true. Although 
they have more often a prior experience as manager, they neither have a better knowledge of 
financial institutions nor a better managerial organization. Moreover, their family did not 
invest more in their business than the average of informal entrepreneurs.  
As far as informal entrepreneurs with familial tradition are concerned, I expect that they are 
endowed with more enterprise-specific skills, social capital and familial investment. It seems 
at this first stage largely true. On average, they have accumulated more experiences that are 
likely to give them higher enterprise-specific skills: experience in the informal business 
before becoming the owner, experience in their profession, and informal apprenticeship 
12 
training. Their social capital seems to be larger through a more frequent membership of a 
professional association and through a more loyal clientele. Their family contributes more to 
the capital formation than family of informal business owner as a whole, both in absolute and 
relative terms.  
Table 2: Informal entrepreneurs characteristics  
Owner characteristics 
(1) 2nd 
generation 
of self-
employed
(2) First 
generation 
of self-
employed
(2)-
(1) 
(3) Self-
employed 
father 
(SE) 
(4) Non 
SE 
(4)-
(3) 
(5) With 
familial 
tradition 
(Trad) 
(6) Non 
Trad 
(6)-
(5) 
Female (%) 49.1 52.3 *** 54.2 60.6 *** 55.4 57.0 NS 
Years of education 2.9 5.0 *** 2.8 4.6 *** 3.0 3.6 ***
Literacy in French (%) 40.1 59.9 *** 37.0 58.7 *** 40.7 46.4 ***
Polygamous (%) 18.2 14.0 *** 18.3 14.3 *** 19.2 16.3 ** 
Muslim (%) 59.1 52.8 *** 58.4 54.7 *** 66.5 55.1 ***
Has not migrated (%) 31.3 56.6 *** 28.7 57.1 *** 40.8 39.6 NS 
Has migrated recently (%) 10.4 5.9 *** 10.8 5.8 *** 11.2 8.4 ** 
Father has primary education (%) 3.5 13.7 *** 2.8 13.3 *** 4.9 6.5 ** 
Father has second. edu. or more 
(%) 
1.9 14.6 *** 1.0 14.3 *** 5.3 6.9 ** 
Managerial skills                 
Prior management experience (%) 19.0 16.0 *** 19.3 16.0 *** 14.5 18.6 ***
Knowledge of MFI (%) 34.1 40.4 *** 34.0 39.8 *** 31.7 37.1 ***
Owner keeps books (%) 30.1 40.8 *** 29.3 40.5 *** 35.1 33.4 * 
Enterprise-specific skills                 
Trad. apprenticeship training (%) 28.7 26.7 NS 28.0 28.2 NS 31.8 27.3 ***
Exp. in that enterprise before 
becoming the owner (%) 
47.3 38.2 *** 47.4 39.4 NS 51.8 43.8 ***
Experience in this profession 
outside this enterprise (%) 
33.7 40.6 *** 33.2 40.4 *** 33.7 36.5 NS 
Years worked in this profession 10.1 8.2 *** 10.1 8.6 *** 11.5 9.1 ***
Social capital                 
No difficulties to find clientele 
(%) 
26.6 25.1 NS 26.5 25.4 NS 31.8 25.0 ***
Member of a prof. association 
(%) 
4.8 2.8 *** 4.6 3.3 *** 7.2 3.5 ***
Familial investment                 
Share of familial investment in 
total investment (%) 
40.0 40.6 ** 39.3 41.6 NS 44.8 39.3 ***
Amount of familial investment 240.0 197.7 NS 238.1 206.6 NS 262.7 218.5 ** 
Family gives a location (%) 5.9 6.5 NS 5.8 6.6 NS 7.0 5.9 ***
Source: Author's computation based on 1-2-3 surveys (Phases 1 and 2, 2001/02, AFRISTAT, DIAL, INS) 
Note: The column Sign test with t-test the significance of the difference between SE versus non-SE and between 
TRAD and non-TRAD. *, **, ***, NS means respectively that the difference is significant at the 10% level, 5% 
level, 1% level, not significant.  
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4. Estimation strategy 
The first step is to test whether being second-generation of self-employed affects firm 
performance. For the reasons mentioned above, I anticipate that TRAD has higher positive 
effects on the productivity of the factors that SE.  
Let us consider a firm with labour, physical, and human capital denoted by L, K, and H 
respectively. The functional form used for regression analysis is basically a Cobb-Douglas 
production function and is estimated in log form. Given the Cobb-Douglas functional form, 
SE and TRAD potentially raise the efficiency of labour, physical and human capital out as a 
Hicks-neutral multiplicative term. I will then estimate the following equations: 
    (1) 
where V stand for the profit, SG indicates whether the owner is a second-generation of self-
employed with ,  , , , and  are functions that 
express the effect of SE or TRAD on the efficiency of labour L, physical capital K, and human 
capital H.  
If SE or TRAD has a significant positive effect on V, this shows that businesses with owners 
belonging to the second-generation of self-employed get higher return from their labour and 
physical and human capital. In that case, SE and TRAD enters the regression as a productivity 
shifter. 
To estimate equation (1), I choose profit as the firm’s performance measure. Profit is the 
difference between total sales and total purchases in value that means all costs for 
intermediate inputs including all paid wages and the income of the owner. Price differences 
between countries are adjusted. Profit is the preferred measure of output but I use total 
monthly sales as an alternative measure of output, as robustness check. 
Labour (L) is defined as the number of monthly hours used in the informal business. Physical 
capital (K) includes buildings and other locations, machines, furniture, vehicles and tools. All 
items are evaluated at replacement costs. Like for profit, price differences between countries 
are adjusted. Human capital (H) is measured by the potential experience of the owner11 in the 
labour market which reflects the gross time that entrepreneurs have spent while in the labour 
force, and by the owner’s education. 
In these estimations, I am confronted with the usual problem of possible endogeneity of the 
production factors because of accumulation over time and unobservable characteristics. 
Unfortunately, to correct for this bias I have at my disposal neither panel data nor good 
instruments. That is why I choose a very simple approach that just splits the sample into 
informal businesses with different levels of capital stock and labour. 
                                                            
11 Age minus years of schooling minus seven, the legal age at school entry. 
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In a second step, I examine the channels through which these variables raise owner 
productivity. As argued above, one possible channel is through intergenerational transmission 
of factors of production allowing a better access to these factors, in particular managerial 
skills, enterprise-specific skills, physical and social capital. Another possible channel is 
through higher total factor productivity. To test these hypothesizes, I expand the estimation of 
equation (1) to include proxy of inherited physical capital . I also split human capital into 
general managerial skills  and enterprise-specific skills , and, following Fafchamps 
(2002), I introduce in the production function social capital as input, denoted S. The 
production function becomes: 
    (2) 
I then identify which of these variables is the more able to capture the effect of having 
benefited from a familial tradition or of having a self-employed father.  
Finally, employing decomposition methods will allow me to evaluate the respective weights 
of greater performance due to better endowments and those due to higher returns. 
   
5. Does second generation of informal self-employed have a competitive advantage? 
To test if having a self-employed father procures an advantage for informal business owner in 
terms of business performance, I estimate equation (1) where business performance is 
measured by the log of profit and sales12. The regressors include a dummy that take the value 
1 if the owner has a father self-employed (SE), labour and capital in the log form13, and 
human capital variables. 
I introduce also some additional variables to control for various background characteristics: 
owner’s sex because women may face difficulties entering the upper-tier segment of informal 
sector for various reasons (household responsibilities, discrimination, restricted mobility); 
polygamous status because redistributive pressure inside the family may be higher and thus 
capital accumulation more difficult (Morrisson 2006); religion and ethnic group because they 
may give access to different social networks; migration status because recent migrants may 
have weaker knowledge about market opportunities14.     
Because of moral hazard consideration, family workers or workers from the same ethnic 
group as the owner may be more productive. For this reason, I include the share of family 
workers and the share of workers from the same ethnic group as the owner in the informal 
business’ workforce as well. In addition, since old enterprises should be better established 
                                                            
12 More precisely, the variable used is the log of the profit  (resp. sales) plus one to avoid losing observations 
with profit (resp. sales) equal to 0. 
13 As for profit, regressors used are log(labour or capital +1). 
14 Father education is not included as control because it is highly correlated with the status of activity of the 
father. 
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than young ones (they have survived), I introduce the age of the enterprise. Lastly, I control 
for the sector of activity and the country.   
Table 3 below reports the main results from OLS regression for all enterprises15. Because of 
endogeneity bias in the estimation of capital and labour parameters, I estimate equation (1) 
with and without introducing them in the regressors.  
Contrary to expectations, having a father self-employed is shown to have no effect on profit 
and sales. This result remains unchanged when I split informal businesses into different 
terciles of capital or of labour, or when I introduce interactions between SE and country 
dummies (not reported) to take into account potentially different effects of SE between 
countries. Another robustness check consists in introducing interactions between SE and 
factors of productions, but SE and interactions coefficients are not significant. Thus, informal 
entrepreneurs that have a father involved in self-employed activities do not benefit from an 
advantage, compared to informal entrepreneurs without self-employed father. This result 
suggests that there is no intergenerational transmission of valuable managerial skills nor 
physical capital for children of self-employed.  
Table 3: Effect of having a father self-employed on profit and sales 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Log profit Log profit Log sales Log sales 
Father was self-employed (SE) -0.0608 -0.0333 -0.00566 0. 0202 
(0.0456) (0.0463) (0.0338) (0.0332) 
Owner's potential experience 0.0281*** 0. 0196*** 0.0423*** 0.0305*** 
(0.00648) (0.00642) (0.00481) (0.00461) 
Owner's potential experience squared -0.00043*** -0.0003*** -0.000607*** -0.000456*** 
(9.45e-05) (9.35e-05) (7.02e-05) (6.72e-05) 
Owner's education 0.0113 0. 0024 -0.00305 -0.01501 
(0.0148) (0.0146) (0.0110) (0.0104) 
Owner's education squared 0.00156 0.00183 0.00451*** 0.0048*** 
(0.00114) (0.00112) (0.000844) (0.000802) 
Amount of capital in log 0. 0833*** 0.127*** 
(0.0117) (0.00844) 
Amount of labour in log 0. 231*** 0. 255*** 
(0.0212) (0. 0154) 
Constant 5.659*** 3.596*** 7.326*** 4.917*** 
(0.211) (0.258) (0.156) (0.186) 
Observations 5712 5712 5701 5701 
R-squared 0.171 0.200 0.316 0.373 
Controls: Owner’s sex, polygamous status, religion, ethnic group, migration status; Ethnic homogeneity inside 
the enterprise, share of family workers, age of the enterprise; Sectors of activity and countries dummies. 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Author's computation based on 1-
2-3 surveys (Phases 1 and 2, 2001/02, AFRISTAT, DIAL, INS). 
 
Regarding the other variables, results by and large conform with expectations: other things 
being equal, higher levels of labour, human and physical capital lead to higher performance 
                                                            
15 The full table is presented in appendix as Table A.  
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(Table 3); men have better business outcomes than women; being born in the city is an 
advantage compared with migrants. However, marital status, religion and ethnic group are not 
significant16 and ethnic homogeneity and the share of family members in the enterprise has a 
significant but negative effect on outcomes (Table A in Appendix). As in Fafchamps (2002), 
family members thus appear to work less hard than hired workers. This could be explained by 
a familial pressure to distribute work that leads to a number of workers uncorrelated with the 
necessary amount of work to produce.  
We now consider the narrower definition of second generation of self-employed, that is 
informal entrepreneurs whose benefit from a familial tradition. If the coefficient of TRAD is 
significant and positive, I can conclude that TRAD enters the regression as productivity 
shifter. I also estimate the equation on subsamples, splitting informal businesses into different 
terciles of capital (models (7), (8) and (9) for profit, (15), (16) and (17) for sales) or of labour 
(models (10), (11) and (12) for profit, (18), (19) and (20) for sales). Results are presented in 
Table 4 for profit and Table 5 for sales17.  
Tables 4 and 5 show that having benefited from a familial tradition has a positive and 
significant effect on informal businesses outcomes: other things being equal, informal 
entrepreneurs with a familial tradition have a profit 13.6% higher than the other informal 
entrepreneurs (model 5). The level and the significativity of the effect is robust to the choice 
of outcomes variables and to the inclusion of capital and labour variables18. It remains 
unchanged for informal businesses with high level of production factors as well19. But having 
benefited from a familial tradition has no significant effect for low and medium level of 
production factors, with the exception of a positive and significant effect of TRAD on sales for 
businesses with medium level of capital.  
                                                            
16 Polygamous status is significant and has a positive effect on profit and sales, contrary to expectations, but 
only when capital and labour are not introduced in the regression. One of the reasons may be that polygamy 
status is highly correlated with capital, because richer men may have more women.  
17 Table B in the appendix presents the full table.  
18 The competitive advantage of TRAD entrepreneurs is equal to  9.9% of the profit (model 6) or 9.7% of sales 
(model 14) when level of capital and labour are included. 
19 With the exception of the upper tercile of capital for profit. 
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Table 4: Effect of inheriting a familial tradition on profit  
  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES All All K<q33 
q33<K 
<q66 K>q66 L<q33 
q33<L 
<q66 L>q66 
Enterprise 
with familial 
tradition 
(TRAD) 
0.128** 0.094* 0.0983 0.145 0.138 0.0313 0.0334 0.239** 
(0.0607) (0. 0597) (0.0935) (0.0916) (0.130) (0.116) (0.0952) (0.105) 
Owner's 
potential exp. 
0.0297*** 0. 0202*** 0.0316*** 0.0300*** 0.0164 0.0283** 0.0269*** 0.0221* 
(0.00651) (0.00643) (0.00906) (0.0108) (0.0142) (0.0112) (0.00996) (0.0127) 
Owner's 
potential exp. 
sqd  
-0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0002 -0.0003** -0.000*** -0.0003* 
(9.47e-05) (9.35e-05) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Years of edu. 0.0113 0. 00376 0.0261 -0.00986 -0.0198 0.0395 -0.00327 -0.00601 
(0.0147) (0.0144) (0.0233) (0.0252) (0.0286) (0.0262) (0.0238) (0.0262) 
Years of 
edu.sqd 
0.00156 0.00182 0.00141 0.00227 0.00281 0.000339 0.00204 0.00283 
(0.00114) (0.00111) (0.00189) (0.00214) (0.0019) (0.00200) (0.00191) (0.00198) 
Amount of 
capital in log 
  0.0836***    
  (0.0117)            
Amount of 
labour in log 
  0. 2298***    
  (0. 0212)            
Constant 5.58*** 3.57*** 5.56*** 6.03*** 5.65*** 4.73*** 4.99*** 5.82*** 
(0.210) (0.256) (0.451) (0.355) (0.407) (0.467) (0.356) (0.361) 
Observations 5712 5712 1865 1925 1922 1736 1993 1983 
R-squared 0.172 0. 200 0.174 0.184 0.154 0.108 0.177 0.194 
Controls: idem models (1) to (4) plus education of the father.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Author's computation based on 1-2-3 surveys (Phases 1 and 2, 2001/02, AFRISTAT, DIAL, INS). 
 
With regard to these results, we can conclude that informal business owners who have family 
members involved in the same sector of activity have on the whole an advantage in terms of 
business performance, compared with owners without familial tradition. This result differs 
from the one of Fafchamps (2002) but, as already said, the context and the field of study are 
very different. However, this result is no longer true when we only consider owners of 
businesses with low or medium level of production factors. For these informal entrepreneurs, 
having benefited from a familial tradition provides no advantage. As far as heterogeneity of 
informal businesses is concerned, we can conclude that such entrepreneurial familial 
background is irrelevant when informal businesses represent a form of urban subsistence 
production.  
Concerning the other variables, results are the same than those of the estimation of equation 
including the variable having a self-employed father (Table B in Appendix). 
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Table 5: Effect of inheriting a familial tradition on sales 
  (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
VARIABLES All All K<q33 q33<K<q66 K>q66 L<q33 q33<L<q66 L>q66 
  
Enterprise with 
familial tradition 
(TRAD) 
0.127*** 0. 093** 0.0317 0.154** 0.204** -0.0164 0.0888 0.173** 
(0.0450) (0.0428) (0.0781) (0.0674) (0.0846) (0.0886) (0.0707) (0.0735) 
Owner's potential 
exp. 
0.0437*** 0.0310*** 0.0492*** 0.0368*** 0.0269*** 0.0421*** 0.0390*** 0.0305*** 
(0.00483) (0.00461) (0.00758) (0.00798) (0.00923) (0.00859) (0.00741) (0.00882) 
Owner's potential 
exp. sqd  
-0.0006*** -0.0004*** -0.0006*** -0.0005*** -0.0003*** -0.0005*** -0.0006*** -0.0004***
(7.03e-05) (6.72e-05) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Years of edu. -0.00495 -0.0155 0.0181 -0.0304 -0.0293 0.0241 -0.0362** -0.0129 
(0.0109) (0.0103) (0.0195) (0.0185) (0.0186) (0.0199) (0.0177) (0.0183) 
Years of edu.sqd 0.0046*** 0.0048*** 0.0034** 0.0044*** 0.0058*** 0.0021 0.0071*** 0.0056*** 
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0013) 
Amount of capital 
in log 0. 127*** 
(0.00843) 
Amount of labour 
in log 0. 253*** 
(0. 0154) 
Constant 7.288*** 4.927*** 6.797*** 7.628*** 7.569*** 6.206*** 6.577*** 7.550*** 
(0.156) (0.184) (0.376) (0.261) (0.265) (0.356) (0.264) (0.251) 
Observations 5701 5701 1857 1924 1920 1729 1990 1982 
R-squared 0.318 0. 383 0.258 0.287 0.365 0.238 0.282 0.322 
Controls: idem models (1) to (4) plus education of the father.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Author's computation based on 1-2-3 surveys (Phases 1 and 2, 2001/02, AFRISTAT, DIAL, INS). 
 
6. What is the source of advantage? 
After having established the positive effect of having benefited from a familial tradition with 
the same choice of activity, we have to highlight the channels though which this familial 
tradition provides an advantage. I will then test the hypothesis that this advantage is mainly 
due to better endowments in enterprise-specific skills, physical capital, social capital, and 
secondly to higher returns to these factors. To this end, I expand the estimation of equation (1) 
to include social capital, familial investments, general and enterprise-specific skills in the 
production function.  
If the hypothesis is true, I expect two results. First, I anticipate that the effect of social capital, 
familial investments, general and enterprise-specific skills are significant and positive. 
Second, I suppose that these effects capture the one of having benefited from a familial 
tradition. It means that the variable TRAD would be significant in equation (2) only because it 
would reflects better endowments and/or returns to managerial skills, enterprise-specific 
skills, familial investment and/or social capital. To know which factors better capture the 
effect of TRAD, I will introduce them step by step, first one by one (not reported) and then by 
pairs (Table 6).  
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I find that when I introduce only one of these factors, the effect of TRAD is still significant. 
Among proxies of managerial skills, only book keeping has a positive and significant effect 
on profit. However, prior management experience doesn’t have any effect on enterprise 
performance. This could be explained by the wide variety of management experiences that not 
necessarily provide better knowledge on how to run a business. Knowledge of microfinance 
institutions is not significant as well. This may be due to the high correlation between this 
variable and the level of schooling of the owner20. All proxies of enterprise-specific skills 
have positive and significant effect: informal apprenticeship, experience in the informal 
business before becoming the owner and years of experience in the profession.  In addition, 
the membership to a professional association has a significant and positive effect on profit. As 
far as proxies of familial investment are concerned, I find a significant effect of the two 
variables but the share of familial investment in total investment has a negative effect.  
Table 6 presents the estimation of equation (3) introducing proxies of transmission channels 
by pairs. It shows that the effect of having benefited from a familial tradition disappears only 
when we jointly introduce proxies of enterprise-specific skills and social capital. The other 
combinations do not allow capturing the whole effect of TRAD. In the same way, when I 
measure business performance by sales instead of profit (not reported), I find that the decrease 
of TRAD effect is the highest when proxies of enterprise-specific skills and social capital are 
jointly introduced. In this case, the estimated coefficient is almost halved.  
                                                            
20 The coefficient of correlation is equal to 0.22 and significant at the 1% level.  
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Table 6: Effect of inheriting a familial tradition on profit introducing social capital, two types 
of skills and inherited physical capital  
   (21)  (22)  (23)  (24)  (25)  (26) 
VARIABLES  Log profit  Log profit  Log profit  Log profit  Log profit  Log profit 
                    
MSE with familial tradition (Trad)  0.114*  0.113*  0.135**  0.0894  0.112*  0.110* 
(0.0604)  (0.0604)  (0.0602)  (0.0606)  (0.0605)  (0.0604) 
Proxies of managerial skills 
Prior management experience   0.0233  0.0154  0.00619 
(0.0560)  (0.0559)  (0.0558) 
Knowledge of MFI  0.0666  0.0589  0.0550 
(0.0461)  (0.0462)  (0.0460) 
Owner keeps books  0.461***  0.460***  0.462*** 
(0.0609)  (0.0609)  (0.0610) 
Proxies of enterprise‐specific 
skills 
Owner was informal apprentice  0.0777  0.0811  0.0671 
(0.0516)  (0.0517)  (0.0517) 
Exp. in that enterprise before   0.250***  0.255***  0.255*** 
     becoming the owner (Y/N)  (0.0741)  (0.0743)  (0.0742) 
Exp. in this profession (years)  0.00827*** 0.00783*** 0.00774*** 
(0.00296)  (0.00297)  (0.00296) 
Proxy of social capital 
Owner is member of a business   0.414***  0.423***  0.421*** 
   association  (0.0973)  (0.0976)  (0.0973) 
Proxies of familial investment 
Share of familial invesment in   ‐0.359***  ‐0.360***  ‐0.363*** 
   total investment  (0.0540)  (0.0542)  (0.0541) 
Log of amount of familial  0.0464*** 0.0541***  0.0528*** 
 investment  (0.0151)  (0.0151)  (0.0151) 
Constant  5.139***  5.399***  5.509***  5.699***  5.805***  6.054*** 
(0.199)  (0.187)  (0.187)  (0.183)  (0.183)  (0.170) 
Observations  5712  5712  5712  5712  5712  5712 
R‐squared  0.181  0.180  0.184  0.175  0.179  0.178 
Controls: Owner’s sex, education level, education level squared, polygamous status, religion, ethnic group, 
migration status; Ethnic homogeneity inside the enterprise, share of family workers, age of the enterprise; 
Sectors of activity and countries dummies. 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Author's computation based on 1-2-3 surveys (Phases 1 and 2, 2001/02, AFRISTAT, DIAL, INS). 
 
Taken together, these results suggest that more valuable social capital and higher enterprise-
specific skills contribute to why informal business owners with family members involved in 
the same sector of activity have better outcomes. One question remains: is the advantage 
explained by better endowments of social capital and enterprise-specific skills or by higher 
returns to these factors? 
To address this issue, I use the Machado and Mata (2005) technique to decompose the profit 
gap between informal entrepreneurs with and without a familial tradition into two components 
– the effect of the difference in the distribution of characteristics and the effect of the 
differences in the distribution of returns to these characteristics. This method extends the 
traditional Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of effects on mean (Blinder 1973, Oaxaca 1973) to 
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the entire distribution. This is done by combining quantile regression and bootstrapping to 
generate two counterfactual distributions: (i) the distribution of the log profit of non-TRAD 
entrepreneurs that would arise if non-TRAD entrepreneurs had the same characteristics or 
endowments as the TRAD entrepreneurs, and if the returns to these endowments remain 
unchanged (counterfactual 1); (ii) the distribution of the log profit of non-TRAD entrepreneurs 
that would arise if non-TRAD entrepreneurs retained their own characteristics but had the 
same returns to these characteristics as the TRAD entrepreneurs (counterfactual 2).  
Let for  denote the th quantile of the distribution of the (log) profit ( , 
given a vector  of covariates. Under the assumption of linearity, these conditional quantiles 
are:  
 
where  is a vector of coefficients.  
The outcomes gap can then be decomposed as follows: 
 
To construct the counterfactual density, I rely on the three following steps. First, I draw a 
random sample of 100 numbers from a standard uniform distribution21. Then, using these 
different numbers denoted by  , with , I estimate the quantile regressions 
coefficient vectors  for the various  using the subsample of TRAD entrepreneurs. 
Finally, I take a draw   times with replacement from the non-TRAD entrepreneurs subsample 
and generate the predicted log profit . This counterfactual log profit density 
indicates which log profit non-TRAD entrepreneurs would have created if they had the same 
returns as TRAD entrepreneurs. 
Figures 1 to 4 presents the decomposition results when covariates include proxies of 
managerial skills, enterprise-specific skills, social capital, and familial investment, plus 
controls of models (21) to (26)22.  
As shown in Figure 1, the gap between profit conditional distributions of TRAD and non-
TRAD entrepreneurs is constant through the distribution. From the second decile, the gap is 
significantly different from zero, as the confidence band, defined by the dashed lines, does not 
cross zero. Figure 4 combines this gap with the two components of the gap decomposition: (i) 
the first one due to differences in characteristics between TRAD and non-TRAD entrepreneurs 
(represented in Figure 2 as well, with the confidence band in dashed), (ii) the second related 
to differences in the returns of these characteristics (reports in Figure 3 as well, with the 
                                                            
21 For details on the asymptotic inference procedures about the coefficients   used in the paper, see 
Chernozhukov, Fernandez‐Val and Melly (2009). 
22 The Stata ado cdeco developped by Chernozhukov, Fernandez‐Val and Melly (2009) was used for ths 
decomposition. 
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confidence interval). Figure 4 shows that the effect of characteristics dramatically dominates 
the effect of coefficient at the bottom of the distribution. At the 2th decile, it explains 64% of 
the gap, and 72% at the 4th decile. Thus, among entrepreneurs with a profit lower than the 
median, the one whose benefit from a familial tradition have an advantage, related to the 
entrepreneurs without a familial tradition and this advantage is mainly due to better 
endowments. However, they don’t have significantly better returns, as showed by Figure 3, 
where zero is included in the confidence band.  
From the 6th decile, this pattern does not stand anymore: the effect of coefficient becomes 
significative and higher than the effect of endowments. Thus, informal entrepreneurs with a 
familial tradition and at the top of distribution have an advantage related to other 
entrepreneurs mostly because they have better returns in their factors of production.  
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7. Conclusion 
This paper has shown that, for West-African informal entrepreneurs, having a self-employed 
father does not provide any advantage in terms of profit or sales. Children of self-employed 
do not have better access to valuable human, physical or social capital. In contrast to USA or 
European countries, there is thus no intergenerational transmission of general managerial 
skills, which would explain such a competitive advantage for children of self-employed. This 
specificity of West African countries with regard to USA or European countries might be due 
to a different way of being exposed to the business of the father.  
This implies that the strong correlation of self-employment status across generations cannot 
be explained by the existence of such a competitive advantage. Alternative determinants of 
this correlation can then be put forward: the conveyance of taste for autonomy, a self-
limitation of professional aspirations or a segmented structure of the labour market that 
constrain children of self-employed to be themselves self-employed in the informal sector. 
However, we do not have evidence to justify acceptance of one hypothesis over another. 
Further research is needed. 
A second important result of this paper is that having family members involved in the same 
type of activity is important for informal businesses, in particular for businesses with high 
level of production factors. The informal entrepreneurs with familial tradition have a 
competitive advantage in terms of profit or sales. At low and medium level of business 
performance, this advantage is mostly explained by the transmission of enterprise-specific 
human capital, acquired thanks to higher opportunities to accumulate experiences in the same 
sector of activity, and by the transmission of social capital that guarantees a better clientele 
and a reputation. At high level of informal business performance, this advantage is mainly due 
to better returns of informal entrepreneurs with familial tradition.  
These findings are important from a policy perspective. Most policies currently in place 
aiming at improving efficiency of informal sector are targeted toward alleviating financial 
constraints. Other programs focus on reinforcing general business human capital, for example 
management and financial skills. My findings suggest that providing opportunities for work 
experience in informal businesses and developing professional networks through associations 
may be effective policies. They might allow would-be informal entrepreneurs to acquire 
enterprise-specific skills and develop their social capital. They would then contribute to 
improving informal sector efficiency and reduce intergenerational inequalities in business 
ownership patterns. However, these issues deserve further investigation on the effectiveness 
of these types of policies, especially evidence from impact evaluations of experimental 
programs.  
Moreover, this paper casts a new light on the heterogeneity of informal sector, by identifying 
social background, in particular entrepreneurial familial background, as a source of 
heterogeneity in terms of performance.   
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Appendix 
Table A: Effect of having a father self-employed on profit and sales (full table) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Log profit Log profit Log sales Log sales 
Father was self-employed (SE) -0.0608 -0.0333 -0.00566 0. 0202 
(0.0456) (0.0463) (0.0338) (0.0332) 
Owner's female -0.615*** -0.505*** -0.603*** -0.454*** 
(0.0508) (0.0509) (0.0377) (0.0367) 
Owner's education 0.0113 0. 0024 -0.00305 -0.01501 
(0.0148) (0.0146) (0.0110) (0.0104) 
Owner's education squared 0.00156 0.00183 0.00451*** 0.0048*** 
(0.00114) (0.00112) (0.000844) (0.000802) 
Owner's polygamous 0.00294 -0.00906 0.0654 0.0510 
(0.0592) (0.0585) (0.0439) (0.0421) 
Owner's Muslim 0.106 0.118* 0.0745 0.0921* 
(0.0668) (0.0660) (0.0497) (0.0476) 
Owner belongs to the majority ethnic group 0.00713 -0.0113 -0.00856 -0.0362 
(0.0450) (0.0445) (0.0334) (0.0321) 
Owner's not a migrant 0.111** 0.117** 0.0945*** 0.102*** 
(ref. has migrated 5 years ago) (0.0477) (0.0470) (0.0354) (0.0339) 
Owner's migrated recently 0.0127 0.0645 -0.0808 -0.0132 
(ref. has migrated 5 years ago) (0.0794) (0.0785) (0.0589) (0.0566) 
Owner's potential experience 0.0281*** 0. 0196*** 0.0423*** 0.0305*** 
(0.00648) (0.00642) (0.00481) (0.00461) 
Owner's potential experience squared -0.000430*** -0.0003*** -0.000607*** -0.000456*** 
(9.45e-05) (9.35e-05) (7.02e-05) (6.72e-05) 
Ethnic homogeneity in the enterprise -0.183 -0.0785 -0.494*** -0.356*** 
(0.159) (0.157) (0.118) (0.113) 
Share of family members in the enterprise -1.064*** -0.687*** -1.288*** -0.799*** 
(0.119) (0.121) (0.0884) (0.0875) 
Age of the MSE 0.0176*** 0.0167*** 0.0179*** 0.0165*** 
(0.00315) (0.00311) (0.00234) (0.00224) 
Amount of capital in log 0. 0833*** 0.127*** 
(0.0117) (0.00844) 
Amount of labour in log 0. 231*** 0. 255*** 
(0.0212) (0. 0154) 
Constant 5.659*** 3.596*** 7.326*** 4.917*** 
(0.211) (0.258) (0.156) (0.186) 
Observations 5712 5712 5701 5701 
R-squared 0.171 0.200 0.316 0.373 
Controls: Sectors of activity and countries dummies.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Source: Author's computation based on 1-2-3 surveys (Phases 1 and 2, 2001/02, AFRISTAT, DIAL, INS). 
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Table B: Effect of having benefited from a familial tradition on profit and sales (full table) 
  (5) (6) (13) (14) 
VARIABLES Log profit Log profit Log sales Log sales 
  
Informal business with familial tradition 
(Trad) 0.128** 0.094* 0.127*** 0.093** 
(0.0607) (0.0597) (0.0450) (0.0428) 
Owner's female -0.614*** -0.506*** -0.605*** -0.458*** 
(0.0507) (0.0509) (0.0376) (0.0367) 
Owner's education 0.0113 0. 00376 -0.00495 -0.0155 
(0.0147) (0.0144) (0.0109) (0.0103) 
Owner's education squared 0.00156 0.00182 0.00460*** 0.0048*** 
(0.00114) (0.0011) (0.000843) (0.0008) 
Owner's polygamous 0.00190 -0.00964 0.0670 0.0531 
(0.0592) (0.0584) (0.0439) (0.0421) 
Owner's Muslim 0.104 0.117* 0.0739 0.0925* 
(0.0668) (0.0660) (0.0497) (0.0476) 
Owner belongs to the majority ethnic group 0.0121 -0.00735 -0.00319 -0.0318 
(0.0451) (0.0445) (0.0334) (0.0321) 
Owner's not a migrant 0.112** 0.117** 0.0872** 0.0937*** 
(ref. has migrated 5 years ago) (0.0472) (0.0466) (0.0350) (0.0336) 
Owner's migrated recently 0.00415 0.0575 -0.0859 -0.0165 
(ref. has migrated 5 years ago) (0.0795) (0.0786) (0.0589) (0.0566) 
Father's primary education  0.0973 0.0983 0.123** 0.123** 
(0.0817) (0.0806) (0.0606) (0.0582) 
Father's secondary education or more 0.158* 0.143 0.0805 0.0579 
(0.0890) (0.0879) (0.0660) (0.0633) 
Owner's potential experience 0.0297*** 0. 0202*** 0.0437*** 0.0310*** 
(0.00651) (0.00643) (0.00483) (0.0046) 
Owner's potential experience squared 
-
0.000445*** -0.0003*** 
-
0.000621*** -0.0004*** 
(9.47e-05) (9.35e-05) (7.03e-05) (6.72e-05) 
Ethnical homogeneity in the enterprise -0.184 -0.0790 -0.495*** -0.357*** 
(0.159) (0.157) (0.118) (0.113) 
Share of family members in the enterprise -1.068*** -0.692*** -1.292*** -0.805*** 
(0.119) (0.121) (0.0883) (0.0875) 
Age of the MSE 0.0162*** 0.0155*** 0.0165*** 0.0154*** 
(0.00321) (0.00317) (0.00238) (0.00229) 
Amount of capital in log 0.0836*** 0. 127*** 
(0.0117) (0.00843) 
Amount of labour in log 0. 2298*** 0. 253*** 
(0. 0212) (0. 0154) 
Constant 5.585*** 3.57*** 7.288*** 4.927*** 
(0.210) (0.256) (0.156) (0.184) 
Observations 5712 5712 5701 5701 
R-squared 0.172 0. 200 0.318 0. 383 
Controls: Sectors of activity and countries dummies. Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Author's computation based on 1-2-3 surveys (Phases 1 and 2, 2001/02, AFRISTAT, 
DIAL, INS). 
